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∼ ABSTRACT ∼ 
 
In February 1992, the twelve member states of the European Union ratified the Treaty 
of Maastricht, and thereby decided to introduce a common European currency by 
2002, the euro. Whereas this was mainly a monetary act of union, previous literature 
has often assumed that the euro also has implications for European identity within the 
participating countries. Evidence from opinion polling data seems to point in the same 
direction: when Eurozone citizens are asked what symbolises the EU for them 
personally, a large majority states that this is the euro. However, this thesis argues that 
the impact of the euro has in fact been marginal – at least initially. The thesis uses 
three in-depth case studies to formulate a hypothesis about the influence of the euro 
on European identity in all EU countries. The case studies are France, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom for the period 1992-2013, examined through data from 
opinion polls and newspaper articles. A second section of the thesis tests the 
hypothesis through comparative analysis of data from three Eurobarometer questions. 
The results suggest that Eurozone citizens did feel more European at first, but that this 
sentiment of Europeanness has declined quickly with the advent of the euro crisis 
since 2009. From then onwards, the opposite of what was expected seems to be the 
case: non-Eurozone citizens have more positive feelings connected to the European 
Union. 
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 4 
Introduction 
Un jour viendra où la France, vous Russie, vous Italie, vous Angleterre, vous 
Allemagne, vous toutes, nations du continent, sans perdre vos qualités distinctes et 
votre glorieuse individualité, vous vous fondrez étroitement dans une unité 
supérieure, et vous constituerez la fraternité européenne. 
  - Victor Hugo in a speech at the International Peace Congress 
        Paris, 18491 
 
Scientific relevance 
Much research has yet been done on the development of European identity in 
countries of the European Union (EU); not only by Eurobarometer, the Public 
Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission,2 but by academic scholars as 
well.3 Whereas collective identities are complex phenomena that are influenced by 
many factors, the impact of the euro on European identity is still an underexplored 
area. This does not mean necessarily that there is little correlation between the two, 
for when European citizens in eurozone countries are asked what the EU means to 
them personally, a large majority mentions the euro as a response. 
 
Purpose of the research 
The aim of this thesis is to examine whether people resident in eurozone countries 
feel more of a European identity than their counterparts outside the eurozone, and 
what kind of triangular relationship exists between European identity, the euro and the 
euro crisis. First, this will be studied on a smaller scale by means of three case studies. 
From those case studies, a hypothesis for European identity in all EU countries will be 
extrapolated. 
 
Scholarly debate and theoretical framework 
The phenomenon of collective identities is a form of solidarity amongst people,  
                                                
1 ‘L’Idée de l’Europe’, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/evenements/textes_victor_hugo.asp. 
Retrieved 11 June 2013. 
2 For more information, see its website: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. Last viewed 
11 June 2013. 
3 A small selection: Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel eds., Europeanization in the Twentieth 
Century. Historical Approaches (Hampshire 2010); Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, 
European Identity (Cambridge 2009); Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass 
European identity (New York 2005); Neil Fligstein et al., ‘European Integration, Nationalism and 
National Identity’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50 (2012) 106-22; and Richard 
Herrmann, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Oxford 2004) 248-53. 
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triggered by the feeling of a fundamental similarity.4 While they are ‘identical’ with a 
certain group, they differ at the same time from ‘the other’; identity is thus established 
as well by excluding others, or even in opposition to others.5 With what or whom 
people identify themselves is influenced by the groups in which they live. “Gender, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class, and age have all been the basis of people’s 
main identities.”6 Recent empirical studies have shown that identity has a positive-
sum nature, i.e. that one can have multiple identities on different levels.7 This means 
that Europe, the national identity and the local identity are all ‘imagined 
communities’.8 The different identities are not distinct; they overlap and lapse into 
one another and are often very compatible. They are triggered in specific situations 
and activated under certain social conditions.9 This means that identity is not fixed, 
but fluid; its character can change significantly over time. 
 Academic literature has generally separated collective, transnational identity, 
and especially European identity, in two. Scholars make a division between elite and 
popular, top-down and bottom-up identity,10 civic and cultural identity.11 On the one 
hand, elites try to create a collective identity that mainly focuses on political 
citizenship and rights, on the liberalisation of national markets and on globalisation.12 
They are therefore people from the highest socioeconomic classes; people that often 
travel, work and live abroad.13 On the other hand, there are blue-collar workers, older 
people and conservatives that respond to mass politics. They focus especially on 
social citizenship and cultural legitimacy.14 Those people are more likely to hold on to 
their own nation and do not want to be linked to their neighbouring countries. When 
looking at Europe, the former category calls itself ‘European’ more often than the 
                                                
4 Göran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000 
(London 1995) 227 et seq. 
5 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, in: Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000) 
5. 
6 Fligstein, ‘European Integration’, 110. 
7 See for example Herrmann, Transnational Identities; and Jim Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim, ‘The 
Dual Nature of European Identity: Subjective Awareness and Coherence’, in: Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009) 19-42. 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(New York 1991). 
9 Fligstein, ‘European Integration’, 116. 
10 See for example Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity; John Fossum and Agustín Menéndez, 
The Constitution’s Gift (Lanham 2011); and Thomas Risse, ‘The Euro between national and European 
identity’, in: Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 10, No. 4 (2003) 487-505. 
11 See for example Bruter, Citizens of Europe?. 
12 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 12. 
13 Fligstein, ‘European Integration’, 113. 
14 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 11-12. 
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latter. Those people associate themselves more easily with other highly educated 
people within Europe, with whom they share the same interests and professions.15 
 Although it is hard to pin down an ever-changing concept as ‘identity’ by 
concrete factors that can be analysed, there are certain characteristics that seem to be 
relevant for European identity, reappearing in different academic disciplines. First, 
there are cultural elements, such as a shared history, and linguistic differences. 
Although it has often been argued that one single language is of great importance for 
national identity,16 the opposite is the case for European identity; multilingualism is in 
fact what distinguishes Europe from other federalist countries.17 Sociological factors 
are important for collective identities as well, i.e. sharing common values. “Values of 
liberty and reason, solidarity and social justice.”18 These human values are 
fundamental for the European community, and are linked to political factors of 
European identity. Member states have a comparable form of state structure, one in 
which all citizens have rights and duties. 
Especially important in the European unification process was Europeanization 
in the monetary sector, from the 1960s onwards.19 The European Commission sought 
to extend its responsibilities in an economic union and wanted Europe to be 
independent from the United States.20 Since the Second World War, European 
currencies were connected to the US dollar in the Bretton Woods monetary system. 
When the US dollar lost value in the 1960s, Europe was forced to look for another 
way to provide monetary stability.21 Furthermore, France was searching to balance 
out economic powers in Europe, for it feared that it might be outweighed by a 
growing Germany.22 Some scholars claim that this acceleration of economic 
integration lead to a fragmented and dispersed European identity.23 The big 
enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, with great influxes of migration as a 
consequence, the defeat of a European constitution in 2005 by Dutch and French 
referenda, the ongoing debate about the accession of Turkey, and the economic crises 
                                                
15 Fligstein, ‘European Integration’, 113. 
16 At least that is what most modernists argue. See for example Anderson, Imagined Communities, 122. 
17 Kristína Bockovà, ‘Language As One of the Most Important Elements of the European Identity’, in: 
R. Gura and G. Rouet, Expressions culturelles et Identités européennes (Brussels 2010) 303-11.  
18 Mario Soares, ‘European identity and political experience’, in: Reflections on European Identity, 59. 
19 Guido Thiemeyer, ‘Europeanization in the Monetary Sector, 1968-92’, in: Conway and Patel eds., 
Europeanization in the Twentieth Century, 172-85. 
20 Ibid., 173-5. 
21 Ibid., 175. 
22 Ibid., 176. 
23 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 2. 
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more recently – these were and are all events, partially non-monetary, that contributed 
to this while triggering a revival of national identity and eurosceptic attitudes.24 
 Whereas the primary goals of the founders of the EU were mainly two things 
– the creation of a common market and the free movement of goods, service, people 
and capital – the EU has greatly enlarged its responsibilities over the past few 
decades. In 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, the EU went beyond its previous goals 
of especially political and economic integration: one of its objectives was the 
realisation of an “ever closer Union amongst the peoples of Europe”.25 The 
establishment of a single currency, the euro, was the ultimate symbol of the renewed 
European integration, next to a concrete function in terms of travelling and working 
within the EU. 
The Maastricht Treaty was not received positively within all EU countries. 
Denmark rejected it, and in France it only passed after a close referendum. 
Previously, European policymaking did not have a large impact on the personal lives 
of citizens, but now, with the EU’s new policies and treaties, a fear of losing 
independence rose, with a decline in public trust consequently.26 Nonetheless, as 
public opinion polls such as Eurobarometer show, support recuperated in the late 
1990s, notably when European currency exchange rates were fixed against one 
another in 1999.27 However, the latest results of the survey, from 2010, show a 
decline again – which could be linked to the advent of the euro crisis.28 In 2009, 
triggered by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, concerns arose about the sovereign-
debt of eurozone countries, particularly Greece; it appeared that the country had 
published falsified statistics about its economy for years. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) required Greece to set its public finances in order. In May 2010, the eurozone 
proposed an aid package worth 110 billion euro to Greece. The intervention was 
                                                
24 Markus Thiel, The Limits of Transnationalism: Collective Identities and EU Integration (New York 
2011) 2. 
25 Treaty on European Union, Preamble. 
26 Thiel, The Limits of Transnationalism, 3. 
27 EB, ‘European and (nationality)’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=266&nationID=11,1,27,28,17,2,16,1
8,13,6,3,4,22,7,8,20,21,9,23,24,12,19,29,26,25,5,14,10,30,15,&startdate=1992.04&enddate=2010.06#2
. Retrieved 28 February 2013. 
28 For a detailed overview of the development of the sovereign-debt crisis, see the interactive timeline 
of The Guardian, ‘Eurozone crisis’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/interactive/2012/oct/17/eurozone-crisis-interactive-timeline-three-
years. Retrieved 10 June 2013. 
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however not enough to reverse the falling exchange rate of the euro, and turmoil in 
eurozone countries continued growing. 
Can one conclude from this that there exists a link between the introduction of 
the euro and the ups and downs of European identity? Research on this topic shows 
that there might be one. Thomas Risse argued in 2003 that the “causal arrows from 
the euro to collective identities flow in both directions.”29 A year later, Matthias 
Kaelberer confirmed this line of thought, arguing that the relationship between the 
euro and European identity is reciprocal. “On the one hand, money is a purposeful 
political tool in the construction of identities. On the other hand, in order to function 
properly, money requires some degree of collective identity among its users.”30 He 
states his argument that money can help to construct a national identity with examples 
from the history of France and Great Britain.31  
This thesis will not take into consideration a possible reciprocal influence, but 
will mainly focus on what impact the euro had and has on European identity, from the 
Maastricht Treaty until the present euro crisis. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis makes use of a historical as well as a political scientific approach. In order 
to understand the general tendencies that are identified in Eurobarometer statistics on 
European identity, case studies on a smaller scale can offer an explanation. All 
countries have had different attitudes towards Europe, which can also explain their 
enthusiasm (or the lack of it) for the euro. However, there are overlapping factors of 
European identity in many countries. By means of an in-depth analysis of three case 
studies, those common factors will be determined.  
A case study of France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom will be 
presented. Those three countries are selected because they present a heterogeneous 
landscape of European identity. France is a country that stimulated the European 
integration process from the start, even since the eighteenth century under the reign of 
Napoleon. In spite of this, they still have a rather strong national identity, which does 
not seem to be threatened by an enlarging EU. In the Netherlands, a national identity 
is less present in a society that has been characterised by cultural diversity for a long 
                                                
29 Risse, ‘The Euro between national and European identity’, 488. 
30 Matthias Kaelberer, ‘The Euro and European Identity: Symbols, Power and the Politics of European 
Monetary Union’, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2004) 161. 
31 Ibid., 167. 
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time. As a smaller country, the Netherlands has much to gain from a strong 
international network and is therefore pro-European to some extent. The last case that 
will be examined is the United Kingdom, that occupies a particular place within the 
EU. The UK entered the EU only in 1973 and decided in 1992 not to adopt the euro. 
Torn between wanting to be a European superpower and the demand not to lose its 
sovereignty, it has had a hesitant attitude towards the unification process.  
Citizens’ attitudes in the three countries towards the introduction of the euro 
will be examined from around 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, onwards. Special 
emphasis will be placed on important years for the introduction of the euro: 1999, 
when European exchange rates were fixed against one another; 2002, with the launch 
of euro coins and bills; and from 2009 onwards, when the euro crisis arose. Source 
material will consist of opinion polls and opinion articles from national newspapers.32 
By means of the themes that emerge from these case studies, the following 
hypothesis for all EU countries will be tested: ‘People have a stronger sense of 
European identity in countries that have adopted the euro and that are more 
affected by the euro crisis’. Testing the hypothesis will be a comparative analysis of 
the results of three Eurobarometer questions on European identity between eurozone 
and non-eurozone countries. 
 
Source criticism 
Whereas the usage of opinion polls for research can be rewarding in the sense that 
they provide a great source on public opinion, there are some limitations to it as well. 
The risk of using polls is that they can insist on a conceptual unity of processes that 
mean different things in different contexts. In this way, they may create the attitudes 
they report, since people wish to provide answers to questions that are posed.33 
Moreover, a certain answer can be triggered by a biased or strategically framed 
question. 
 Different public opinion tracking institutions will be used, of which 
Eurobarometer is most important. In general, Eurobarometer provides source material 
that is quite reliable. Since 1973, Eurobarometer has been tracking public opinion on 
different topics of European citizenship in all EU countries. In ‘Standard 
Eurobarometer’, the same kind of questions is posed between two and five times a 
                                                
32 For more information on the selection and application of the source material, see the below. 
33 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge 2009) 10. 
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year, of which a twice-yearly publication follows. In each member state 
approximately 1000 citizens of 18 years and older are interviewed face-to-face. 
However, questions do vary over the years; some have proven not to be as effective as 
predicted, others had to be reframed as the European Community (EC) changed.  
 One Eurobarometer dossier is of particular interest for this research: ‘Public 
Opinion and the Euro’.34 The goal of the surveys held within this theme is to “monitor 
the state of public opinion on the euro and understand the underlying factors which 
influence it” since the introduction of the euro in 2002.35 These data are gathered 
through ‘Flash Eurobarometer’: ad hoc telephone interviews on specific topics.36  
 The different national public opinion tracking organisations have a 
comparable approach. Samples usually consist of roughly 1000 national citizens of at 
least 15 years of age that are interviewed via telephone. However, there are some 
trackers that use Internet surveys for their results. Those surveys are less reliable, 
since not all social classes and groups are active on the Internet. As the Dutch Central 
Agency for Statistics (CBS) has put it: “Je probeert iets te zeggen over een populatie 
vissen in twee vijvers, door een steekproef te nemen uit één vijver, en dan alleen van 
de vissen die uit het water springen.”37 This kind of Internet based public opinion 
tracking will therefore be avoided where possible. 
Surveys have been selected on the basis of their topics; they either report 
attitudes towards the EU or to the euro, or ask more specific questions related to 
European identity.38 There is not always continuity in the space of time when 
Eurobarometer or national trackers pose the same question. Therefore, this thesis uses 
measuring point of once a year, in October or November every year, in order to obtain 
a more stable and uninterrupted overview of the course of the data. Summary charts 
can be found in the Appendices (43 et seq.). 
 
Opinion articles will then be used to interpret the tendencies that the results of the 
surveys show. However, the media do not truly reflect the opinion of the masses; they 
                                                
34 See: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/euro_en.htm. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The following surveys in the eurozone were used for this research: Flash EB 139, 153, 165, 175, 
193, 216, 251, 279, 306, 309, 335, 362. For non-eurozone countries, of which the United Kingdom, 
Flash EB 98 (2001) and 121 (2002) were consulted. 
37 “You try to say something about a fish population in two pools, by taking a sample survey in one 
pool, and then only of the fish that jump out of the water.” Jelke Bethlehem, in: Mark van Baal, 
‘Kleinste steekproef gaf beste voorspelling’, in: Technisch Weekblad 2 (2006). 
38 For a complete overview of the questions that have been taken into account, see Bibliography. 
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influence public opinion, and therefore add to its construction.39 They are usually 
precursors, and are often written from an ‘extreme’ point of view; they are generally 
more negative, positive, conservative or progressive than the opinion of ordinary 
citizens. Furthermore, the authors reflecting upon the case of European identity are 
often highly educated journalists or professors. It is therefore more likely that articles 
have an elite perspective than a popular. Nonetheless, the articles can help us explain 
the underlying tendencies for how the course of public opinion develops, while 
identifying the themes that correspond to the rises and declines in European identity.  
 French, Dutch and British opinion articles have been selected for the case 
studies by means of the LexisNexis News Database.40 Search terms included 
‘European identity’, ‘euro and European identity’, ‘introduction of the common 
currency’ and ‘Maastricht Treaty’, in all three languages. From these, sources have 
been selected firstly by the credibility and independence of the national newspaper, 
secondly by the credibility and independence of the author, thirdly by whether it 
expressed an opinion, and last by relevancy for this thesis. Special attention has been 
paid to the years around the Maastricht Treaty (1991-1993), the introduction of the 
euro (1998-2003), and since the start of the crisis (2009 onwards).41 
 
Structure 
Chapter 1 will be the case study of France. It will become clear that in France, 
European integration is generally seen as a positive undertaking that does not form a 
threat to the national identity. The French perceive the newest trait of the integration 
process, the euro, as a European symbol. However, European identity in France has 
not increased much since the introduction of the common currency. It is influenced by 
other factors as well, mainly by French anti-Americanism and the rise of nationalism 
through the fear of immigration. On the other hand, the French do not see the euro as 
the end of the integration process; Europe also needs to become a political union. 
In chapter 2 on the Netherlands, comparable pillars on which Dutch European 
identity is founded are visible. Again, newspaper articles underline that the EU needs 
to integrate more on the political level. Furthermore, resistance to immigration is 
                                                
39Thiel, The Limits of Transnationalism, launches a new theory in ‘Chapter 6: Newspaper Discourse 
and Public Spheres’, 127 et seq., namely that the media not only construct public opinion, but are a 
reflection of it as well. 
40 Online accessible with a university ID and password at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/search/newssubmitForm.do. 
41 For a complete overview of the articles that have been taken into account, see Bibliography. 
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rising as well over the past few years. This does however not have negative 
consequences on Dutch European identity. The euro definitely has had an impact; the 
Dutch themselves state they feel more European since using the euro.  
 The United Kingdom presents less of a European identity, and one that is still 
declining. The isles have had a eurosceptic attitude since the beginning of the 
European integration process, for the UK wanted to remain sovereign. That is one of 
the reasons it decided not to adopt the euro. The fact that British European identity is 
weakening nowadays could be explained on the one hand by their continued use of 
the pound sterling. On the other hand, different factors contribute to this decline as 
well, such as the fear of too many immigrants and the current sovereign-debt crisis. 
Whereas all three countries are characterised by a different discourse of 
European identity, there are five themes that return in all cases. Those will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, which will furthermore present a hypothesis that follows from 
these elements. First, the three countries emphasise that economic integration should 
be accompanied by political integration; the latter is not necessarily a result of from 
the former. Second, when citizens know less about the structure of the EU, they are 
less enthusiastic about its expanding responsibilities. This lack of knowledge of the 
project results in suspicion towards it and is reinforced by the gap between the people 
and the elite initiators of the project. Third, in all countries there has been a rise of 
xenophobic nationalism since around 2005, when the Eastern EU enlargement 
occurred. Fourth, people generally seem to feel more European in the countries where 
the euro has been introduced. On the other hand, the launch of the euro has not led to 
the reinforcement of European identity in all cases. Fifth, newspaper articles 
demonstrate that the euro crisis has an impact on European identity as well. Whereas 
it binds the eurozone countries together, it drives the non-eurozone country further 
away from the EU.  
From these five themes, the following hypothesis can be extrapolated for all 
EU countries: ‘People have a stronger sense of European identity in countries 
that have adopted the euro and that are more affected by the euro crisis’. By 
means of evidence from three Eurobarometer questions on European identity, this 
hypothesis will be partially falsified.  
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1. The Euro, European Identity and France: Case Study No. 1 
 L’Europe est un Etat composé de plusieurs provinces. 
   - Charles de Montesquieu, 172742 
 
Montesquieu is not the only important Frenchman that has pleaded for France to 
tighten the bonds with its European neighbours; many have preceded and would 
follow him. This can explain why the French have always had somewhat of a pro-
European attitude. This first chapter examines in detail the discourse of French 
European identity. Whereas one might assume that this pro-European attitude would 
lead to great support for the euro, evidence from polling data and news articles about 
the euro show that this is not the case. On the contrary, the influence of the common 
currency on European identity in France appears to be minimal; generally, the French 
have a quite stable European identity.  
 
1.1. French attitudes towards Europe before 1992 
The French seeds for a ‘United States of Europe’ had already been planted at the end 
of the eighteenth century, through the consequences of the Napoleonic Wars. Some of 
these are still of great importance for the EC (or even beyond it), such as the 
Napoleonic Code and the reform of the metric system, but especially the spread of 
nationalism under Napoleon, after the French Revolution. This nationalistic sentiment 
became very strong in France, and is an important part of French identity. It even 
evolved into extreme patriotism in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century.43  
In the course of the nineteenth century, certain central figures were already 
committed to the idea of a unified Europe, including the writer Victor Hugo. As a 
result of his lobbying, the French Assemblée Nationale called for a United States of 
Europe as early as March 1871.44 The First World War subsequently increased the 
need for a politically unified Europe that would create a peaceful environment, but the 
Second World War was of greater impact. In 1943, Jean Monnet, the French political 
and economic adviser who is often seen as the founder of the EU, dedicated himself 
to the cause of European integration to regain and retain peace. He declared:  
                                                
42 Montesquieu, ‘Chapitre XVIII’, in: Réflexions sur la monarchie universelle en Europe (Paris 1727). 
43 Girardet Raoul, ‘Pour une introduction à l’histoire du nationalisme français’, in: Revue française de 
science politique, Nr. 3 (1958) 509 et seq. 
44 For this and more general information about the history of France (and other member states) in the 
EU, see http://en.strasbourg-europe.eu/france,13345,en.html. Retrieved 29 May 2013. 
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Il n’y aura pas de paix en Europe si les États se reconstituent sur une base de 
souveraineté nationale (…). Les pays d’Europe sont trop étroits pour assurer à leurs 
peuples la prospérité (…). Leur prospérité et les développements sociaux sont 
impossibles, à moins que les États d’Europe se forment en une fédération (…).45 
  
This federation was established firstly in the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1952, where France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
West Germany agreed to confer powers over their steel and coal production. When 
the EC expanded thereafter, France always played an initiating part in it. Especially 
when it came to more economic integration from the 1960s onwards France took the 
lead; for the French, this was a way to control and reduce West Germany’s power in 
Europe, which had grown when the value of the Deutschmark increased in the mid-
1960s, while the exchange rate of the French franc had not ceased to devaluate since 
then.46 The main objective of this economic integration was to create more equal and 
stable inter-European relationships.47 From that period onwards, an integrated Europe 
meant for France the German ally, ‘l’Amitié franco-allemande’. 
 In spite of these pro-European elite initiatives, French citizens only narrowly 
supported the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty after a referendum in September 
1992, also known as the ‘petit oui’.48 Generally though, the French are of the opinion 
that their membership to the EC is a good idea (Appendix A).  
 
1.2. The launch of the euro: support and opposition 1992-2012 
This ‘petit oui’ at the time of the Maastricht Treaty ratification is reflected in data 
available from opinion polls, both from Eurobarometer and from the French public 
opinion tracker TNS Sofres. The polls show that the support of the French for a 
common currency used to be slightly more than the majority, i.e. 55% à 58%, with an 
undeniable dip in 1992.49 In newspaper articles a similar tendency is visible. Authors 
express their concern about the launch of the euro, for it mainly emphasises European 
economic integration. Over the past twenty years, many articles have argued that a 
                                                
45 ‘Jean Monnet, l’unificateur’, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-
fathers/pdf/jean_monnet_fr.pdf. Retrieved 29 May 2013. 
46 Thiemeyer, ‘Europeanization in the Monetary Sector’ 177. 
47 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘The Euro Crisis: A Historical Perspective’, in: LSE IDEAS (2011) 9. 
48 ‘Elections/Les résultats’. Online available at http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/ 
Elections/Les-resultats/Referendums/elecresult__referendum_1992/(path)/referendum_1992/000/ 
000.html. Retrieved 29 May 2013. 
49 EB, ‘Single European Market hope or fear’ (1988-1996) and ‘One European currency for or against’ 
(1995-1997). Online available via the Eurobarometer Interactive Search System (EBISS), retrieved 28 
February 2013. 
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more profound political integration, with a stronger democracy and social cohesion as 
a consequence, is the condition for the success of the euro – and of the EU.50 
 The lack of explicit enthusiasm for the euro can be explained by the fact that 
French citizens believed themselves not to be very well informed about the launch, 
and were therefore unaware of the possible positive effects. Only after 1998 did a 
majority believe itself to be rather well informed about the new common currency; 
beforehand the opposite was the case.51 The writers of opinion articles are well aware 
of this gap of knowledge, which is often expressed in a call for more disclosure: “Il 
est donc urgent de mettre en place une véritable campagne de sensibilisation, qui 
prenne en compte la dimension véritablement affective de la monnaie (…).”52  
 Although the French have not always been very enthusiastic about this new 
trait of European economic integration, they have been realistic about it. Even during 
the last five years, despite the sovereign-debt crisis, there is a kind of ‘acceptance’ of 
the status quo in French newspaper articles. “Même si les prix ont augmenté, les 
Français ont compris que l’euro les protégeait.”53 Despite extreme right-wing parties 
such as Front National under the guidance of Marine Le Pen wishing that France 
would leave the eurozone, many newspaper articles acknowledge that this is an 
unattainable goal – in fact, they even want France to keep the euro. An opinion poll 
by TNS Sofres in 2011 reflects this tendency: a majority of 67% wants France to 
remain in the eurozone.54 
 
1.3. The euro and European identity in France 
The French people have thus accepted the euro as a part of their daily lives. In fact, 
the euro has become an important symbol of Europe for the French.55 When citizens 
are asked at what moments they feel European the most, the majority answers that this 
                                                
50 See for example Jean-Dominique Lafay, ‘Perspectives et problèmes de la monnaie unique; 
L’Europe, géant économique, reste un nain politique’, in: Le Figaro (15 January 1999).  
51 EB, ‘Informed about the European currency’ (1995-2001).  
52 Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, ‘Il faut une voix forte et claire pour l’euro’, in: Les Echos (2 May 
2001) 77. 
53 Didier Micoine and Henri Vernet, ‘Il faut débattre de l’identité européenne’, in: Le Parisien (9 May 
2011). 
54 TNS Sofres, ‘Le sentiment européen chez les Français’ (2011), http://www.tns-
sofres.com/_assets/files/2011.05.12-europe.pdf. Retrieved 14 May 2013. 
55 TNS Sofres, ‘Les Français et la citoyenneté européenne’ (2008), Question 3, http://www.tns-
sofres.com/points-de-vue/B4F6B60463434C96B2944DD8029890BF.aspx. Retrieved 14 May 2013. 
The same point of view becomes clear as well when reading newspapers; see for example Frédéric 
Fritscher, ‘Pas d’Europe sans symboles européens’, in: Le Figaro (6 February 2008). 
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is when they think of the euro.56 Furthermore, they think the euro stimulates a 
common bond between European citizens of the different member states.57  
 However, there is no clear-cut answer to the question whether French citizens 
feel more European since using the euro; responses to this Eurobarometer question 
fluctuate. In absolute terms, positive responses have only grown slightly; from 19% in 
2002 to 21% in 2012 (Appendix B). In other words, ten years of using the euro did 
not necessarily increase the French feeling of Europeanness. These absolute data 
therefore seem to contradict the answers to more detailed questions about the euro and 
Europe posed by TNS Sofres.  
 
1.4. Development of a European identity in general in France  
The data mentioned above show that the reinforcement of a European identity in 
France as a consequence of the euro is minimal. Data about French European identity 
in general corresponds to this tendency. Appendix C demonstrates that the percentage 
of French citizens that say they feel French and at the same time European is 
relatively stable. However, since 2005, there is a sudden decline, reaching the lowest 
percentage from the moment that the question has been asked. Unfortunately, there 
are no data available between 2005 and 2010, which makes it more difficult to explain 
this.  
Recent newspaper articles about European identity present a tendency that 
does not necessarily correspond to polling data from 2005 onwards. The 
accomplishments of Europe are underlined; its military forces, its human rights 
system, and its strong economic power.58 However, authors remain critical of the 
integration process and actively propose possible alterations for a more democratic 
and successful EU, of which further political integration specifically is seen as 
unbearable for its survival or reinforcement, especially with the advent of the crisis. 
“Plus que jamais depuis l’apparition de la crise, l’urgence d’une nouvelle idée 
européenne, d’une idée civique et politique, d’une nouvelle formulation de ce qui 
fonde l’identité européenne se fait criante.”59 
                                                
56 Ibid., Question 7.  
57 Ibid., Question 4. 
58 See for example Joseph Nye, ‘Quel avenir pour l’Europe?’, in: Le Figaro (17 June 2010) 14. 
59 Sylvie Kauffmann, ‘A la recherche de “l’Homo europeus”, cet inconnu’, in: Le Monde (9 May 
2013). 
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A specific characteristic of French European identity is that it is often opposed 
in the media to Americanism. French public opinion trackers have also conducted 
surveys about this topic. A strong form of anti-Americanism has always distinguished 
the French national identity.60 The French used to feel threatened by the power of the 
United States, and wanted to keep out American cultural influences. Nowadays, 
European unification has improved the position of France compared to the US. With 
the introduction of the euro, the French assumed that the economic power of Europe 
in the world would increase.61 One could therefore suppose that the French would feel 
strongly connected to the euro, but no extremely positive attitude is discernable. A 
possible explanation for this could be that the French do not perceive a concrete link 
between the euro and anti-Americanism. Although this phenomenon is remarkable, it 
is not the topic of this thesis and will therefore not be discussed in more detail.  
 
1.5. Interpretations and conclusions 
In French opinion polls, many questions about European identity and about the euro 
are asked. This means that these topics are important to the French. Although the 
charts show that France has never been a fervent supporter of the euro, French 
citizens themselves say that the euro symbolises Europe for them. They do not want 
the euro to disappear, and this is a point of view that returns in newspaper articles as 
well. One might therefore expect that European identity would have grown since the 
introduction of the euro, since the French are more exposed to European symbols with 
the advent of the common currency. However, opinion polling does not support the 
idea of a clear emergence of European identity. On the contrary, a downward 
movement since 2005 is discernable.  
 A possible explanation for the relative stability of French European identity 
can be that the influence of the euro on the latter is balanced out by other factors. A 
collective identity is built from many different elements.62 The impact of the euro 
apparently does not outweigh the share of the other factors, nor is it strengthened by 
the French anti-Americanism of today.  
                                                
60 Philippe Roger, L’ennemi américain. Généalogie de l’antiaméricanisme français (Paris 2002). The 
book offers a genealogy of the French anti-Americanism from the mid-eighteenth century until 
nowadays.  
61 EB 71, ‘Euro more powerful than dollar’ (2009) 158. 58% of the French think that this will be the 
case, compared to 25% that do not agree with the statement. 17% did not answer the question. 
62 See introduction. 
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The decline since 2005 in the percentage of French citizens that feel European 
too can be clarified by means of newspaper articles on this topic. In France, the 
popularity of nationalistic political parties has been rising, especially as a result of the 
influxes of illegal immigrants into the EU from 2009 onwards, through Spain, Italy 
and Greece in particular, and the possible prospect of Turkey entering the EU.63 
Europeanness is often opposed to nationalism, and can come under pressure because 
of this rising nationalistic sentiment.  
However, the media remain fairly positive, though critical of the EU. They 
want the euro to succeed – and see no other option for France than to make it succeed. 
They practically think of ways to reach this goal: by creating more powerful European 
political institutions. But in spite of this positive realism, the first counter thoughts 
about scrapping the euro are rising.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 See the results of the presidential elections in 2007 and 2012, where the popularity of for example 
the FN and MPF clearly rises. ‘Elections/Les résultats’, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-
resultats/Referendums/elecresult__referendum_1992/(path)/referendum_1992/000/000.html. Retrieved 
29 May 2013.  
64 See for example Arnaud Rodier, ‘L’euro, dans nos poches depuis une décennie; Difficile 
anniversaire’, in: Le Figaro (30 December 2011) 20. 
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2. The Euro, European Identity and the Netherlands: Case Study No. 2 
[W]ij begrijpen de zorgen van de Nederlanders. Over het verlies aan soevereiniteit. 
Over het tempo van verandering, zonder dat burgers zich daarbij betrokken voelen. 
Over onze financiële bijdrage. 
  - Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende, 1 June 200565 
 
In a referendum in 2005, 61.5% of the Dutch people voted against the establishment 
of a European Constitution. Whereas the Dutch had previously been rather positive 
towards European integration, this big ‘no’ was an indication for politicians that the 
European unification process was accelerating too quickly for Dutch citizens. In spite 
of their previously positive attitude, the feeling of Europeanness in the Netherlands is 
not that strong. However, the euro did have a positive influence on Dutch European 
identity; it reinforced it, especially – and surprisingly – since the development of the 
sovereign-debt crisis. 
 
2.1. Dutch attitudes towards Europe before 1992 
As a country bordering the sea and therefore located at the geographical boundaries of 
Europe, the Netherlands has been a nation characterised by a trade economy, 
especially from the colonisation period onwards. Traditionally, it therefore benefited 
from international cooperation and diplomatic relationships. But despite its grand 
colonial past, it never became an economic or political superpower within Europe. Its 
sea location resulted in an ongoing struggle against water, which unified Dutch people 
in a common goal.66 Nonetheless, Dutch identity was never marked by a chauvinistic 
sentiment like French identity. A factor that contributed to this is that the Netherlands 
received many immigrants, in the past and nowadays. Today, foreign-born residents 
of this country make up 20% of its population.67 The constant influx of migrants made 
Dutch identity more volatile and changeable. 
Historically, the Netherlands was involved in some European conflicts, in 
particular with its southern neighbours (Belgium and France), Spain, and Great 
                                                
65 “[W]e understand the concerns of the Dutch. About the loss of sovereignty. About the rapidity of 
change, without the citizens. Feeling involved. About our financial contribution.” ‘Statement 
Balkenende’, http://nos.nl/artikel/120643-verklaring-balkenende.html. Retrieved 18 June 2013. 
66 Niek van Sas, ‘Geschiedenis-Herinnering-Identiteit. De historici en het Nationaal Historisch 
Museum’, in: BMGN Low Countries Historical Review, Vol. 124 No.3 (2009) 429. 
67 CBS, ‘Bevolking; kerncijfers’, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37296ned&D1=a&D2=0,10,20,3
0,40,50,60,(l-1),l&HD=130605-0924&HDR=G1&STB=T. Retrieved 6 June 2013. 
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Britain, but this changed in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
During the First World War it took in a neutral position, conserving its trade 
relationships. In the Second World War it aimed for a similar arrangement, but could 
not remain neutral. The War left great marks on the Netherlands, forcing it to 
redouble its efforts in the reconstruction of the nation, and drove the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxemburg together in the establishment of the Benelux in 1943, the 
first European unity in a customs agreement and economic community.68 
Thenceforth, the Netherlands remained closely involved in the further process, and 
was, like France, a founding member of the ECSC.  
The support of Dutch citizens for their country’s membership of the EC has 
always been high; around 72% on average (see Appendix A). There was no 
referendum about the Maastricht Treaty in the Netherlands, but because of this high 
support it can be assumed that in general people were in favour of the Dutch 
ratification of it; in newspapers one does not find evidence of fervent opposition.  
 
2.2. The launch of the euro: support and opposition 1992-2012 
Generally, the Dutch people were always in favour of their country joining the 
eurozone. When Eurobarometer asked between 1995 and 1997 whether citizens were 
for or against all member states having the same currency, the average support of this 
by the Dutch was 62%.69 This is reflected in newspaper articles. But although the 
majority of the authors are in favour of this next step in the process of European 
integration, they do have some critical suggestions. Like in France, Dutch opinion 
articles underline that economic integration alone is not enough. Authors plead for 
cooperation on multiple levels; for a political union next to an economic one, a 
common policy for foreign affairs and security, and cooperation on the level of police 
and justice.70 However, in 2005 it became clear that Dutch public opinion did not 
support this extensive progress in political integration, when the referendum the 
European Constitution did not pass. Yet many of the ‘no’-voters had different reasons 
                                                
68 ‘Histoire’, http://www.benelux.int/fr/bnl/bnl_geschiedenis.asp. Retrieved 3 June 2013. 
69 For source reference, see footnote 49, 14. 
70 This is a theme that recurs over the years. See for example Edmond Wellenstein, ‘Niet langer met de 
rug naar Europa’, in: NRC Handelsblad (10 December 1991); or Arjo Klamer and Laurent van der 
Maesen, ‘Euro moet politiek nog worden waargemaakt; geloofwaardigheid hangt af van Europese 
politieke unie’, in: De Volkskrant (20 December 2010). 
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for rejecting the European Constitution; for example to utter their dissatisfaction with 
the government at that time, or the fear of Turkey entering the EU.71 
 Over the past five years, since the sovereign-debt crisis came about, more 
articles discuss who is to blame for the crisis. Many exposés recognise that it is easy 
to point the finger at the EU. They themselves mainly accuse the individual member 
states. Whereas in the 1990s and early 2000s they called for more political integration 
together with economic integration, they now assume that it was the lack of the 
former that caused the crisis. They therefore plead for more federalism if Europe 
wants to overcome the recession. They are definitely not thinking of scrapping the 
euro. “Sneuvelt de euro, dan sneuvelt ook de Unie.”72 
 
2.3. The euro and European identity in the Netherlands 
The fact that those newspaper articles all plead for saving the euro could imply that 
Dutch citizens feel attached to their new currency, and therefore as well to the EU. 
Evidence from opinion polls shows clearly that the euro contributes to the Dutch 
feeling of Europeanness (Appendix B). Compared to 2002, Dutch citizens say they 
feel more European since using the euro. The recent sovereign-debt crisis did not 
influence this rise in a negative way. In fact, it might even have contributed to the 
Dutch European identity, for when Dutch citizens are asked what represents the EU 
for them the most, the euro is most frequently mentioned since 2009.73 That the crisis 
contributes to a shared bond amongst European citizens is visible in a few newspaper 
articles as well. The Bismarckian welfare state, the state structure that caused the 
current economic problems, is something all EU countries have in common. That is 
where European roots can be found: “Of de gezamenlijke cultuurgeschiedenis en de 
joods-christelijke achtergrond voldoende is voor een levensvatbare Europese identiteit 
kan iedereen voor zich beslissen. Maar Bismarck bindt dezer dagen alle 
Europeanen.”74 
                                                
71 Maurice de Hond, ‘Europees Referendum 31 mei’ (2005) 2. 
72 “If the euro falls, the Union falls too.” Guy Verhofstadt and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, ‘Zonder de euro 
sterft Europa’, in: NRC Handelsblad (3 October 2012). 
73 EB, ‘Meaning of EU’. Online available via EBISS, retrieved 20 May 2013 
74 “Whether the common cultural history and the Judeo-Christian background are enough for a 
sustainable European identity is something that everyone can decide for themselves. But it is Bismarck 
that binds all Europeans these days.” Michel Kerres, ‘Bismarck en de Maagd Maria; Grenzeloos’, in: 
NRC Handelsblad (27 May 2010) 7. 
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 At the same time, a contradictory tendency in the newspapers occurs. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, many authors assumed that the introduction of the euro would 
reinforce a shared European identity. Since a few years however, authors have the 
idea that Dutch citizens are not attached at all to the euro. “Nederlanders hebben 
weinig met de euro en dat uit zich in ons taalgebruik. Waar de gulden ons inspireerde 
tot allerlei liefkozende bijnamen, (…) komt de gezamenlijke Europese munt niet veel 
verder dan ‘pleuro’.75 Het gebrek aan bijnamen zegt iets over de waardering.”76 
Emphasis is placed on the fact that the development of collective identities is a 
bottom-up process, it is not something that can be forced or accelerated by the 
installation of common institutions.  
This contradiction of tendencies is remarkable: on the one hand, the Dutch 
themselves say that they do feel more European since using the euro (measured by 
means of public opinion surveys), but on the other, newspaper articles argue that the 
Dutch do not feel European at all.77 
 
2.4. Development of a European identity in general in the Netherlands  
A small majority of Dutch citizens perceive themselves as European next to their 
Dutch nationality (Appendix C). This majority has been growing since 2004, although 
it is hard to predict whether this increase continues; the chart does not provide 
information between 2005 and 2010, and from 2010 onwards, nor do Dutch national 
opinion tracking institutions. 
 As the previous section has demonstrated, many newspaper articles state that 
Dutch people generally do not feel very European. The explanation they offer for this 
phenomenon is that citizens do not a have a solid orientation point, for most national 
politicians do not know themselves how to handle Europe.78 Dutch people are not 
very involved in European politics, for they are not offered the opportunity; Europe is 
still an elite project. If national citizens were given the chance to participate more in 
                                                
75 Corruption of the Dutch word for pleuritis. 
76 “The Dutch have very little in common with the euro and that is reflected in our language. Whereas 
the guilder inspired us to all kinds of affectionate nicknames, (…) the best the common European 
currency can do is ‘pleuro’. (…) The lack of nicknames tells us something about appreciation.” ‘Munt 
met laag knuffelgehalte’ in: De Telegraaf (28 December 2011) 24. The ‘affectionate nicknames’ are 
mostly diminutives, such as ‘dubbeltje’, for the small 10-cent coin, or ‘joetje’ for the 10-guilder note. 
77 See ‘Munt met laag knuffelgehalte’; Martin Mevius, ‘Patriot én Europeaan’, in: NRC Handelsblad 
(14 May 2009); and Hans Schlaghecke, ‘De Europese identiteit groeit van onderop’, in: Het Financiële 
Dagblad (29 December 2001). 
78 Michelle de Waard, ‘Angst voor Europa; op kousenvoeten naar Kopenhagen, of: Wie zal dat 
betalen?’, in: NRC Handelsblad (7 December 2002). 
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European politics, they would possibly feel more European as a consequence. These 
writers are of the opinion that the structure of the EU has to change and that a 
European identity is not (yet) established. They try to think of ways of how the EU 
can be improved and Europeanness can be created. In other words, they might have a 
rather negative point of view at the outset, but there is no mentioning of leaving the 
EU or eurozone; they accept the idea of a unified Europe, but are more critical of how 
it is implemented.79  
 
2.5. Interpretations and conclusions 
The Netherlands has been pleased with their membership to the EC from the start. 
The small country used to have a rather strong economy, but always depended on its 
relationships with neighbouring countries for its trade. It never became a major power 
within Europe, like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Its society was and is 
characterised by multiculturalism, which has made the Dutch nation relatively open 
and tolerant to foreigners. 
 Because of this multicultural society and emphasis on transnational 
relationships, Dutch national identity never became very strong or delimited. This 
could be an explanation for why Dutch citizens have always been positive about their 
country’s membership to the EU, and also for why they are more susceptible to the 
development of European identity through the introduction of a European symbol, the 
euro. 
 Even with the rise of nationalism all over Europe nowadays, reinforced by 
populist parties responding to the growing fear of massive immigrant influxes, no loss 
of a common European identity is visible in evidence from public opinion data 
(Appendix C). As a matter of fact, there is a rise in the share of citizens that would 
call themselves European. At the same time, Dutch citizens say to feel more European 
since using the euro. Since 2009, this sentiment has been on the rise (Appendix B). 
This can be explained by the development of the sovereign-debt crisis from that year 
on; the euro binds all participating countries in their economic problems, Greece’s 
economic illness is the concern of the whole of Europe. This feeling of all countries 
being connected can lead to the increased feeling of a European identity.  
                                                
79 See Klamer and Van der Maesen, ‘Euro moet politiek nog worden waargemaakt’; ‘Over de drempel’, 
in: NRC Handelsblad (2 January 2002); De Waard, ‘Angst voor Europa’; and Verhofstadt and Cohn-
Bendit, ‘Zonder de euro sterft Europa’. 
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In conclusion, the Dutch do feel more European indeed since the euro has 
become their currency. However, Dutch European identity is not (yet) very strong. 
This is something that is acknowledged in opinion articles, but it is said that closing 
the gap between the initiators of the project and European citizens can solve it. In this 
way, citizens will become more involved, and a European identity will be the natural 
consequence of that involvement. 
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3. The Euro, European Identity and the United Kingdom: Case Study No. 3 
We’re not in the euro and I’m glad we’re not in the euro. We’re never going to join 
the euro and we’re never going to give up this kind of sovereignty that these countries 
are having to give up. 
  - British Prime Minister David Cameron, 9 December 201180 
 
The United Kingdom is traditionally a eurosceptic country that does not feel strongly 
connected to the continent. This is one of the reasons why it never introduced the euro 
as their currency; the opposition to the euro is closely linked to a negative or 
suspicious attitude towards Europe in general. Because of that, this chapter’s second 
section treating the reactions to the introduction of the euro on the continent will be 
rather brief. Since there is not that much data available from opinion polls on a 
possible link between the euro and British European identity – since the British do not 
use the euro – it is difficult to assess how preserving the pound influenced the British 
European identity. Whatever the case, it will become clear that European identity in 
the UK has generally declined during the past twenty years. 
 
3.1. British attitudes towards Europe before 1992 
It is no news that the UK has always occupied a particular place within Europe. 
(Moderate) British anti-Europeanism has a long history. As a superpower, Britain was 
keen to keep Europe divided, so that there was no one dominant power that could 
threaten its independence. It would therefore usually support smaller European 
nations or powers against the larger ones.81 In the course of the eighteenth century, 
Britain allied with anyone who was against France in the Seven Years’ War (1756-
1763). This continued at times of Napoleon, the latter being one big figure as a reason 
for the British to be adverse to a unified Europe historically. 
For most of the nineteenth century, Britain had a policy of ‘splendid isolation’, 
as it had a global empire and played the ‘great game’ against Russia.82 The rest of 
Europe lagged behind in terms of naval power until the 1890s, when the new German 
Empire began to compete. As an island, it was influenced to a lesser extent by 
                                                
80 Bruce Crumley, ‘Euro Treaty Takes Shape, but Without Britain’, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2101975,00.html. Retrieved 18 June 2013. 
81 This is a ‘tactic’ that still has its equivalent in our days; UKIP argues that all countries should retain 
their national democracies. 
82 Chris Gifford, The making of Eurosceptic Britain: identity and economy in a post-imperial state 
(Ashgate 2008) 11 et seq. 
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developments on the mainland (and vice versa) and it therefore developed a society of 
its own. 1848, an important year for the European mainland, did not affect Britain. 
Britain was the most modernised industrially at the time in comparison to the 
continent, and it was going in a different direction politically. This increased the 
British distrust of Europe. Even nowadays, the UK still differs in many ways from the 
continent; for example, it is more traditional, with a more pronounced social class 
structure as a consequence.83 
However, the Second World War and the threat from the USSR of a 
communist takeover stimulated the UK to participate in the unification process. In 
1946, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for a “United States of 
Europe”, but he did not initially see Britain as being part of this new union:  
 
We British have our own Commonwealth of Nations. (…) And why should there not 
be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common 
citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent and why 
should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings in shaping the destinies 
of men? (…) France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and I trust Soviet Russia – for 
then indeed all would be well – must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe 
and must champion its right to live and shine.84  
 
Nonetheless, the UK helped found the Council of Europe in 1948 with the Treaty of 
London. In the further process towards a more unified Europe, the UK watched more 
from the sidelines. It did not become a member of the ECSC; many coal and steel 
industries had just been nationalised and the government did not want to lose control 
over those industries. The UK only joined the EEC in 1973, after two unsuccessful 
applications in 1961 and 1969 that both were vetoed by France. The latter feared that 
British membership to the EEC would weaken the French voice within the 
Community, and that “close Anglo-American relations would lead to the United 
States increasing its influence in Europe”.85 
 The UK’s participation in the European integration process had therefore a 
rocky start, and over the course of many years the UK would remain hesitant. When 
                                                
83 Mike Savage et al., ‘A New Model of Social Class: Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class 
Survey Experiment’, in: Sociology, Vol. 47 No. 2 (2013) 219-50. 
84 Winston Churchill, ‘A British Patriot for Europe: Winston Churchill’s Speech on Europe University 
of Zurich, 19 September 1946’, in: Zeit Online, http://www.zeit.de/reden/die_historische_rede/200115_ 
hr_churchill1_englisch. Retrieved 29 May 2013. 
85 ‘Parliament & Europe’, http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-europe/overview/britain-and-eec-to-
single-european-act/. Retrieved 6 June 2013. 
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Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, she opposed the further development of a 
political European union.86 The issue of European integration was also troublesome 
during John Major’s Government from 1990 to 1997. When the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) was established in 1994, with the first plans for a single 
European currency, the UK obtained an opt-out from joining EMU in return for 
agreeing to the Maastricht Treaty. At first, Major opted out for its social policy 
provisions, but through a very narrow Parliament motion the Treaty was ratified in 
1992. 
 
3.2. The euro on the continent: reactions of the United Kingdom 1992-2012 
British politicians were never eager to introduce the euro in the UK. Prime Minister 
Tony Blair stated that before the UK would consider joining the euro, the EMU would 
have to pass ‘five economic tests’.87 When those tests were met, he promised to hold a 
referendum on whether or not adopting the common currency. The tests are not yet 
met. 
British citizens always spoke quite firmly against the introduction of the euro 
in their own country; they have been opposing it by around 65% on average over the 
past twenty years.88 This opposition has been very stable over the last two decades 
(Appendix D). However, a very large majority did think that it was inevitable that this 
would happen eventually.89 Whereas in 1999 the British thought the euro was not 
really a success for the participating countries – which can be explained by its 
extremely low exchange rate right after its introduction – they did expect that this 
would change in the future, and that the euro would very well be able to compete with 
the dollar.90 
 Newspaper articles have been divided about whether or not the euro should 
become the British currency as well, and if not, what role the UK should play in 
European politics. Generally, many newspaper articles express an anti-euro attitude in 
                                                
86 Simon Lightfoot, ‘European Integration and the UK’, in: BBC News (22 November 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/bbc_parliament/2638513.stm. Retrieved 6 June 2013. 
87 The five economic tests are on convergence, flexibility, investment, UK’s financial service industry 
and the effect on UK employment. For more detailed information, see ‘UK Membership of the Single 
Currency’, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/euro_assess03_repexecsum.htm. Retrieved 7 June 2013. 
88 See Ipsos MORI, ‘Joining The Euro - Trends Since 1991’ (2007); and EB, ‘For or against one 
European currency’. 
89 Ipsos MORI, ‘Joining The Euro’ (2000-2002), Q4. 
90 Ipsos MORI, ‘Attitudes to Europe’ (1999), Q5-6. 
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the sense that they want to keep the pound sterling. Cartoons and other propaganda 
reflect this attitude.91 The most important reason for this is the fear that Europe might 
become too powerful and deprive them from their national sovereignty.  
 
3.3. The euro and European identity in the United Kingdom 
If the UK would join the euro, it would have to give up a part of its responsibilities for 
policymaking. This is the largest obstacle for the UK, not only concerning their 
membership of the eurozone, but of the EU in general as well. “Sovereignty cannot be 
shared or pooled. It is either here, in our hands, or elsewhere in those of other 
institutions.”92 When asked in opinion polls, it becomes clear that not only the opinion 
precursors think that this will be the case, but the British electorate as well.93 
This fear of the UK losing its independence is linked to the fear of losing 
national identity. Between 1995 and 1997, Eurobarometer posed the question: “Do 
you believe that the European currency will or will not imply that (our country) will 
lose (too much of) its (national) identity?”.94 A stable 62% average said that this 
would be the case for the UK, whereas in other European countries, this share 
decreased from around 40% initially to 35% in 1997. This is one of the reasons why 
the British do not want to adopt the euro; they want to maintain their sovereignty and 
national identity. On the other hand, they do think that introducing the euro is a 
further step towards European integration, and that it will create a link between 
Europeans;95 a process of which they will not be and do not want to be a part. 
However, there are also articles that advocate a different approach from the 
UK towards the EU. As French and Dutch newspapers have shown, the euro is often 
seen as more than just an economic project; it has a political impact as well. Since 
2008, with the advent of the sovereign-debt crisis, more articles are pleading for the 
UK to play a more active part in the euro crisis. The euro crisis would be a good 
opportunity for the UK to extend its influence in the EU, by mediating between 
                                                
91 See for example Michael Cummings, ‘No thanks, I’m a family man!’, in: The Times Magazine (21 
June 1997), http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/4c5efeaf-b441-4d71-9c37-cf4e6ce7a673/en. 
92 Norman Tebbit, ‘Hijack on the Euro express’, in: The Guardian (12 November 1991). 
93 See EB, ‘Agreement with statements about consequences of euro’ (1995-2001). Online available via 
EBISS. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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France and Germany, two big economic players that have opposite perspectives on 
how the crisis should be handled.96 
In 2008, there are quite a few articles that opt for the UK to enter the 
eurozone. The sovereign-debt crisis has had repercussions in the UK as well, and 
some authors are of the opinion that entering the eurozone would help to overcome 
the financial problems. This is however not the only argument that they come up with: 
more importantly, they think that the eurozone will very probably overcome the crisis, 
and become stronger and more unified in the process. Then, there only will be a place 
at the margins for the UK.97 
In spite of these recent counter-developments, a large majority of newspaper 
articles think that the crisis will certainly lead to the downfall of the euro – and the 
disintegration of Europe consequently. Europe was not ready for a monetary union in 
the first place. The UK should stay as far away as possible from the future “black 
swans.”98 Had the UK joined the eurozone in 2003, the EU would probably have been 
scattered already.99 
 
3.4. Development of a European identity in general in the United Kingdom  
The rejection of the euro by the UK can be explained by the UK’s anti-European 
attitude overall. The UK does not see the euro alone as a threat to their sovereignty 
and national identity, but is afraid of a more prominent EU in general. A further step 
towards European integration by using the euro as their currency would therefore 
mean a further step towards the loss of national identity as well. Evidence from 
Eurobarometer, shows that that this fear has increased by 10% over the last ten 
years.100  
Not only this fear has increased, so has the negative attitude towards Europe in 
general. Until October 2008 the most frequent response to the question what the EU 
means to British citizens personally was ‘Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere 
                                                
96 See for example ‘The euro crisis is a political one and Britain should play its part’, in: The 
Independent (22 May 2010) 42. 
97 Will Hutton, ‘Europe will thrive. But we could be doomed to a life on the fringes’, in: The Observer 
(10 June 2012) 36. 
98 Rachel Sylvester and Alice Thomson, ‘You should let the EU destroy itself, which it eventually 
will’, in: The Times (26 May 2012) 26-7. 
99 Larry Elliot, ‘Analysis: What if Britain had joined the euro in 2003?’, in: The Guardian (3 June 
2013) 23. 
100 EB, ‘Fears regarding the building of EU’ (1995-2006). Online available via EBISS. 
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in the European Union’. Since June 2009, that has shifted to ‘A waste of money’, 
followed since November 2011 by ‘Bureaucracy’.  
Since January 2013, the UK’s membership of the EU is even more often 
debated, because Prime Minister David Cameron promised a referendum on British 
membership of the EU in 2017 if his party would return to power after the next 
elections. This would be the second referendum on this topic, the first one being held 
in 1975, which indicates that the British commitment to the EU has been in doubt for 
many years.101 Evidence from polling data confirms that the UK’s enthusiasm for the 
EU lies far lower than the EU-average (Appendix A). Since the UK has never had a 
very pro-European attitude, we can assume that they do not feel very European as 
well. Moreover, the percentage that feels both British and European has even declined 
over the pas twenty years (Appendix C). 
 
3.5. Interpretations and conclusions 
The United Kingdom has always had a difficult relationship with the rest of Europe, 
and especially with France. As an island, it was never completely involved in or 
influenced by the events on the continent, but was more occupied with unification 
problems within its own Kingdom. Initially, it did not play an active part in the 
European unifying process after the Second World War, and it has stood at the 
sidelines ever since. The fear of losing its sovereignty and national identity to a 
stronger EU prevented it from getting too involved, and is a major reason why it 
decided not to adopt the euro. When European integration increased over the past few 
decades, British European identity moved in the opposite direction. 
 An explanation for the British lack of enthusiasm for the European project, 
besides evidence from history, is that British citizens are generally not very well-
informed about European institutions. In this respect, they occupy the lowest rank of 
all EU countries.102 The fact that this lack of knowledge contributes to negative 
attitudes towards the EU is a phenomenon that other European countries show as well 
(but to a lesser extent), where it is a theme that frequently returns in newspaper 
articles.103 
                                                
101 An interesting overview on this question is offered by BBC News, ‘UK and the EU: better off out or 
in?’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20448450. Retrieved 9 June 2013. 
102 EB, ‘Awareness of the EU institutions’. Online available via EBISS. 
103 See for example Jean-Louis Levet, ‘L’Europe est elle communautaire?’, in: Les Echos (23 April 
1993) 33; De Vabres, ‘Il faut une voix forte et claire pour l’euro’; and De Waard, ‘Angst voor Europa’. 
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 What contributes to the British current anti-Europeanness is a development 
seen in France and the Netherlands as well, namely an augmented polemic attitude 
towards immigration influxes. Since 2000, migration flows into the UK increased 
drastically compared to the century before.104 The British fear that when the EU has 
more to say about each member state’s policymaking, they will not have the 
possibility anymore to decide on their own migration policy, with more immigration 
in the UK as a consequence.  
 Whether there exists a correlation between the decline of British European 
identity (Appendix C) and the fact that the euro was not introduced in the UK is hard 
to say. Inevitably, the factors mentioned above also contributed to this development, 
and it is difficult to filter out the influence of the euro from that context. Furthermore, 
this is of course not an all-round picture of the British European identity; there are 
many other relevant factors as well. A cautious conclusion from these data could then 
be that preserving the pound sterling was one of the contributing factors to a declining 
sense of European identity in the UK. However, this does not mean necessarily that 
there would have been a more pronounced European identity in the UK had the euro 
been introduced; as newspaper articles indicate, this could have led to even more 
opposition to the EU because of the sovereign-debt crisis and to the eventual downfall 
of the euro and the EU.105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 ONS, ‘Long-term Migration into and out of the United Kingdom, 1964-2011’, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/interactive/theme-pages-1-1/index.html. Retrieved 9 June 2013. 
105 Larry Elliot, ‘What if Britain had joined the euro’. 
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4. Attributing the Case Studies: Hypothesis for all EU countries 
When looking at those three European countries, three different discourses of 
European identity are revealed. However, there are five main themes return in each 
case. The last two of those themes, on the euro and the euro crisis, will be used to 
establish a hypothesis for all EU countries. This hypothesis on the euro, euro crisis 
and European identity will then be tested by means of three Eurobarometer surveys in 
the whole of the EU, to see whether there is a difference in European identity 
discernable between eurozone and non-eurozone countries. 
 
4.1. The three case studies in a nutshell and five recurring themes 
In France, Europe is generally seen as a positive undertaking and European 
integration does not form a threat to the national identity. French citizens feel 
European to some extent and are happy with the euro as their currency, which is 
visible in the way they perceive the currency: as a European symbol. However, the 
French European identity has not increased much since the introduction of the 
common currency. It is influenced by other factors as well, mainly by French anti-
Americanism and the rise of nationalism through the fear of immigration issues. On 
the other hand, the French do not see the euro as the end of the integration process; 
Europe needs to become a political union as well. 
In the Netherlands, there are comparable pillars on which Dutch European 
identity is founded. Here, newspaper articles underline too that the EU needs to 
integrate more on the political level if it wants the economic union to succeed. 
Furthermore, resistance to immigration has been rising as well over the past few 
years. However, this does not have negative consequences on Dutch European 
identity. In fact, the Dutch even feel more European compared to two decades ago. 
The euro definitely has had an impact, as the Dutch themselves state when asked if 
they feel more European since using the euro (Appendix B). An explanation for the 
success of the euro and the reinforcement of European identity in the Netherlands 
could be that the Dutch never had a very strong national identity in the first place.  
 The United Kingdom presents less of a European identity, and it is still 
declining. The island has had a eurosceptic attitude since the beginning of the 
European integration process, for it wanted to remain sovereign. From polling data we 
can conclude that British citizens feel threatened by the EU, in the sense that ‘too 
 33 
much EU’ might compromise their national identity. It is therefore not surprising that 
the UK decided not to adopt the euro. The fact that the British European identity is 
getting weaker nowadays could be explained on the one hand by their preserving of 
the pound sterling. On the other hand, different factors contribute to this decline as 
well, such as the fear of too many immigrants and the current sovereign-debt crisis. 
 These three discourses represent three different perceptions of the European 
integration process. This indicates that the matter at hand is complex. Collective 
identity is volatile and influenced by many factors, and this goes for the diverse 
discourses of European identity as well. The traditions of the different countries create 
the conditions under which European identity floats – or sinks.  
Despite the variations in European identity, there are certain themes that return 
in all three cases. First, all countries, including the UK, emphasise that the EMU can 
only flourish when the EU is integrated politically to some extent as well, and when 
its tasks and responsibilities are more clearly defined. However, the different 
countries do each have different approaches to what a political union should look like, 
from a collection of sovereignties to a hardcore federal state. 
 Second, when citizens know less about the structure of the EU, they are less 
enthusiastic about its expanding responsibilities. There is a gap between the people 
and the elites that initiated the European integration project in the first place. Because 
people are not aware of all the aspects of the EU, either advantageous or 
disadvantageous, this lack of knowledge of the project results in suspicion towards it. 
This explains why pro-Europeans plead for a European awareness campaign in their 
countries.   
 Third, in all countries there has been a rise of xenophobic nationalism since 
around 2005, which has led in some cases to a decreased feeling of Europeanness. 
However, this is not the case in the Netherlands, where European identity has not 
declined very much. 
 Fourth, people feel generally more European in the countries where the euro 
has been introduced. On the other hand, the launch of the euro has not led in all cases 
to the reinforcement of European identity.  
 Fifth, newspaper articles argue that the euro crisis has had an impact on 
European identity as well. Whereas it binds the two eurozone countries, it drives the 
non-eurozone country further away from the EU. 
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4.2. Hypothesis for European identity in the EU countries in general 
These five themes are of course a simplified representation of the European identity 
problems at stake. Since the first three themes are outside the scope of this thesis, the 
hypothesis that can be extrapolated from the previous case studies concerning the 
euro and European identity is: ‘People have a stronger sense of European identity 
in countries that have adopted the euro and that are more affected by the euro 
crisis’. This hypothesis will be tested for the whole of the EU, with data from 
Eurobarometer in all EU countries. At the outset the first part of the hypothesis may 
seem obvious, if reasoning that eurozone countries had to be pro-European in the first 
place, for otherwise they would not have introduced the euro. This is however not the 
case. The choice of whether or not to adopt the euro in a member state is usually one 
of the individual governments, which make their decisions without first consulting 
their citizens. Citizens therefore do not necessarily support the introduction of the 
euro in their country. 
 In order to test the hypothesis of whether there is a difference indeed between 
European identity in eurozone and non-eurozone countries, those two categories will 
be compared. The zones will both be considered as one entity; we will not look 
whether there are individual differences between countries that for example have 
joined the EU more recently than others. The entity of the eurozone countries consists 
of the seventeen EU member states that have adopted the euro, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
The ten EU countries that still use their own currencies are Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
While it was rewarding to look at different kinds of source material for the 
three cases, the sources for this chapter are based on evidence from Eurobarometer 
opinion polls alone. The sense of European identity will be measured by means of 
three main questions. The most important question is whether citizens feel that they 
not only have a national identity, but a European one as well (examined before in 
Appendix C). Because of the fact that Eurobarometer does not pose that many 
questions about European citizenship and identification with the EU, other questions 
that indicate a feeling for Europeanness have also been taken into account. Therefore, 
attitudes towards Europe will be examined, namely whether eurozone countries 
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perceive the EU in a more positive way than non-eurozone. A last question will 
measure how the EU is symbolised in the different countries; do citizens from 
eurozone countries more often use positive symbols to describe the EU? These three 
surveys of the whole of the EU only partially offer insight into the matter of European 
identity in general. It is somewhat of a simplification of the complexity of measuring 
collective identities, in order to make it more attainable to test the hypothesis.  
 
4.3. Feeling both (nationality) and European 
In eurozone countries, the number of respondents expressing simultaneously 
European and national identity lies approximately 10% higher than in the non-
eurozone (Appendix E). Although within the two zones the countries vary to a large 
extent, the range of the percentage of citizens that feel European in addition to their 
own nationality in the eurozone lies roughly between 40% and 70%, while that is 
between 30% and 60% in the non-eurozone. 
 What is remarkable is that whereas the number of respondents expressing 
simultaneously European and national identity fluctuates over the years in both 
eurozone and non-eurozone countries, the distance between the two zones remains the 
same. In technical terms, the two graphics of the eurozone and non-eurozone run very 
parallel (Figure 3). This means that, in spite of having the euro, citizens react 
approximately in the same way to events that happened in those years. It is, however, 
difficult to establish a solid correlation between those events and the dates that are 
mentioned, for there could be countless reasons for it. Explaining the fluctuations of 
the curves is not the aim of the current research. 
 Whereas it is clear that citizens resident in eurozone countries feel more 
European, this does not imply that they feel more European because they have the 
euro as their currency. In eurozone countries, citizens already felt approximately 10% 
more European before the euro was introduced. Not in any important year for the euro 
(1992, 1999, 2002106) eurozone citizens react more positively to the idea of European 
identity than their non-eurozone counterparts. In fact, responses to this Eurobarometer 
question would be proof that the euro is not that important for the feeling of 
Europeanness, since all countries seem to react similarly over the years.  
                                                
106 See Introduction for why these years are important. 
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 The euro crisis does not seem to have had a different impact on eurozone 
countries compared to non-eurozone countries. After 2005, European identity declines 
in both zones, as could have been expected from the three case studies. Unfortunately 
Eurobarometer does not provide more detailed information about the period 2009-
2013, which could tell us if this downward movement continues or not. When 
however examining individual eurozone countries that are particularly affected by the 
crisis, i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia and Cyprus,107 it becomes clear that 
they feel far less European compared to 2005. Especially in countries that suffer 
severely from the crisis, European identity weakens quickly: compared to the 6% 
average decline, it declines in Greece by 7%, in Italy by 10%, in Slovenia by 22% and 
in Cyprus by 13%. Based on these data, the euro crisis seems to have a negative 
influence on European identity in the countries that are most affected by it. To help 
achieve the understanding of this development, other source material could provide 
more insight for the period 2005-2010, and 2010 and onwards. 
 
4.4. Positive image of the EU  
People usually feel more attached to their country when their attitude towards it is 
positive. How European citizens perceive the EU could therefore tell us something as 
well about their European identity. When looking at the eurozone, it is clear that the 
positive view of the EU decreases drastically after 2009, in all countries. This decline 
is less apparent in non-eurozone countries. In fact, since 2010, non-eurozone 
countries have a more positive view of the EU than the eurozone (Figure 3).   
 The most probable explanation for this drastic decrease in eurozone countries 
is the euro crisis that started in 2009-2010. When examining again the countries that 
suffer most from the crisis, the enthusiasm for the EU in those countries drops in one 
year by at least 20% after either 2009 or 2010, or in the case of Greece by 30% after 
2009. These data could help predict the further course of European identity (Appendix 
E); it is very probable that the decline has continued since 2010.  
 Interesting is that citizens’ attitudes towards the EU in non-eurozone countries 
are apparently less affected by the crisis, although the recession has had repercussions 
in those countries as well. An explanation for this could be that those countries remain 
sovereign to some extent and are therefore less affected by euro problems, while still 
                                                
107 See footnote 28, 7. 
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having the benefits of their EU membership. One of those advantages is the 
possibility to travel. 
 
4.5. Symbols of the EU 
As became clear from the case studies of France and the Netherlands, many citizens 
of those two countries see the EU symbolised in the euro. One might thus assume that 
they have a stronger European identity since they use the euro, and are therefore 
confronted with Europe every day. There are other symbols and phenomena that 
could translate the feeling of Europeanness as well. When Eurobarometer posed the 
question what the EU means to citizens personally, they offered a variety of answers 
next to the option to suggest spontaneous responses. The set answers had connotations 
that are generally seen as positive (such as ‘Peace’ and ‘Economic prosperity’), 
negative (such as ‘Unemployment’ and ‘Waste of money’), and arguably both or 
neither (such as ‘Euro’ and ‘Cultural diversity’). While in eurozone countries the 
option ‘Euro’ was mentioned repeatedly, there was one answer that was most 
frequently mentioned in nearly every country: ‘Freedom to travel, study and work 
anywhere in the European Union’.108 In non-eurozone countries, the percentage that 
gives this as a response is higher than in eurozone countries (Appendix G), and leaves 
a large distance between that answer and all others. In eurozone countries, the 
percentages of the different answers lie often very close to one another.109 This could 
indicate that in those countries European identity is built up of many different factors 
and therefore probably more complex, while in non-eurozone countries freedom to 
travel is a particularly important building block of their European identity.  
 Appendix H demonstrates that freedom to travel is important to both zones. 
What is more remarkable is that there are no large differences in percentages of 
positive symbols between the two categories, and that respondents from both zones 
react similarly over time. Since 2009, opinion in the two zones started to diverge 
(Figure 3). Whereas the hypothesis assumed that eurozone citizens would see the EU 
visualised more frequently in positive symbols, in fact the opposite is the case: people 
from non-eurozone countries use slightly more often positive symbols to describe 
their European citizenship, especially since 2009. This confirms that 2009, the start of 
                                                
108 For more on the influence of travelling and tourism on the formation of national and transnational 
identities, see Orvar Löfgren, On Holiday. A history of vacationing (London 1999). 
109 See for more information the answers of the individual member states, online accessible via EBISS. 
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the crisis, is a turning point of European identity. Again, the hypothesis is 
contradicted: the euro crisis does not reinforce the feeling of a shared identity in 
eurozone countries – it rather weakens it.  
 
4.6. Interpretations and conclusions 
In testing the hypothesis ‘People have a stronger sense of European identity in 
countries that have adopted the euro and that are more affected by the euro 
crisis’, the first part of the hypothesis can be confirmed based on the data displayed in 
Appendix E. However, this does not mean that eurozone citizens feel more European 
because they use the euro. Since Eurobarometer does not provide continuous data 
European identity, it becomes difficult to examine whether the decline in the feeling 
of Europeanness has continued as the crisis intensified. When looking at the other two 
Eurobarometer questions that could clarify the matter of European identity, a turning 
point in 2009-2010 is visible. Since that point, non-eurozone countries have in general 
been more positive about the EU, in the way they perceive it, and what symbols they 
connect to it. 
The euro crisis is probably the cause of the decrease in European identity and 
positive view of the EU. In the eurozone, stronger countries share the burden of the 
economic problems of the weaker, while the latter are dependent of the help of the 
former. In the end, citizens will have to save the economy and the euro through 
increased taxes. What could contribute to this is that during the five years that the 
crisis has been ‘dragging on’, no suitable and solid solution has been found.110 In non-
eurozone countries, citizens share less of the responsibility to improve the economy 
and the euro. Whereas journalists and academics might think that the crisis forces a 
bond between euro-using citizens, in practice this is not visible. This underlines again 
the difference between elite views and those of the masses – a discrepancy that is also 
visible in the case studies. 
In short, based on the available source material, it can be stated that the 
hypothesis is partially true. Initially, eurozone citizens did feel more European than 
their non-eurozone counterparts. This was already the case before the euro was 
introduced. The euro did not, however, reinforce European identity in those nations, 
                                                
110 Angela Merkel warned in June 2012 that it would not be possible to solve the crisis quickly. 
‘Merkel waarschuwt voor grote beloftes van snelle oplossingen’ (27 June 2012), http://www.europa-
nu.nl/id/vj0pia022smn/nieuws/merkel_waarschuwt_voor_grote_beloftes?ctx=viuteb8r4izb. Retrieved 
11 June 2013. 
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for euro- as well as non-eurozone countries responded similarly to events that 
happened in time. Only with the advent of the crisis, eurozone citizens reacted 
stronger to developments than those outside of it. European identity thus seems more 
related to economic prosperity (or recession) than to a common currency alone. So in 
fact, the opposite of the assumption in the hypothesis is the case: since 2009-2010, 
with the advent of the sovereign-debt crisis, non-eurozone citizens feel more 
positively connected to the EU than those inside the eurozone.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has proven that although there seems to exist a correlation between 
European identity and the euro, this is not truly the case. People who use the euro as a 
currency feel more European than those who do not, but already did so before the 
euro was introduced. Evidence from polling data demonstrates that both eurozone and 
non-eurozone countries react very similarly over the decades. However, since 2009-
2010, non-eurozone citizens perceive their European citizenship in a more positive 
way than their euro-spending counterparts. The advent of the sovereign-debt crisis 
triggered this development, forcing eurozone countries to share responsibilities for 
trying to master economic issues, while the non-eurozone was less involved in and 
affected by it. 
The main theoretical tenets of this study and the formulated hypothesis have 
been built upon the insights of three detailed case studies of France, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. Every country presents a different discourse of European 
identity that can mainly be explained by means of their historical background and 
national identities. In France, an anti-American, moderate European identity is 
typical; in the Netherlands, there exists an open attitude to the EU because of the 
absence of a strong national identity; and the UK has shown a eurosceptic, hesitant 
approach from the start. 
 Despite these great variations, certain themes recur in all three cases. 
Foremost, newspaper articles argue that with an economic union, a political union has 
to be established additionally. Economic integration can only succeed when it is 
monitored intensively by common policies and legislation.  
Another important motif is the recognition that there exists a gap between the 
elite initiators of the project who are commonly pro-European, and the masses. The 
latter group cannot fully comprehend the effects of the integration process, partially 
because there has not always been sufficient information provided. In articles, 
arguments recur for a European awareness campaign in EU countries.  
In addition, anti-immigrant nationalism rises in the three countries. Since 
2005, extreme right-wing and left-wing populist parties responded to this fear of 
massive migrant influxes, which strengthened nationalist sentiment. 
Furthermore, in France and the Netherlands, both eurozone countries, citizens 
felt more European than in the UK. In the Netherlands, citizens stated that the launch 
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of the euro even reinforced their feeling of Europeanness, in spite of economic 
problems since 2009. 
 Finally, many newspaper articles assumed that the euro crisis would force a 
bond between eurozone countries stimulate and therefore the development of a 
European identity. The UK, while not having the euro, would end up at the margins 
when the eurozone would have survived the crisis. 
 From the case studies, it is possible to derive the general hypothesis that 
‘People have a stronger sense of European identity in countries that have 
adopted the euro and that are more affected by the euro crisis’. This hypothesis 
was tested for all EU countries by means of three Eurobarometer questions about 
European identity. When citizens were asked directly if they felt European in addition 
to their national identity, eurozone countries scored 10% higher averagely indeed. 
Unfortunately, this first Eurobarometer question did not provide continuous data, and 
was asked for the last time in 2010. These last years are especially crucial, for the 
other two surveys about the image and symbols of the EU show a relative increase in 
positive attitudes since 2009-2010 in non-eurozone countries compared to the 
eurozone. The sovereign-debt crisis therefore certainly has an influence on European 
identity, but a negative one. Positive attitudes in countries that have adopted the euro 
drop drastically with the advent of the crisis. The second part of the hypothesis is 
therefore falsified. 
 A remarkable observation is that for all three surveys, opinion in eurozone and 
non-eurozone countries runs almost completely parallel; eurozone respondents did not 
react to important euro developments in 1992, 1999 and 2002 with increasingly 
positive attitudes towards Europe (Appendix E). This means that there is little 
difference in the way both zones respond to important events or issues that face the 
EU and their country. It also implies that the euro alone does not truly influence 
European identity, probably because it is balanced out by many other factors. 
Economic changes are more strongly connected to European identity. 
 
In conclusion, the hypothesis is partially falsified. It is correct that eurozone countries 
feel more European, because they already felt it before the introduction of the euro. 
When the euro crisis occurred, this shifted however, resulting in more positive 
attitudes towards the EU in non-eurozone countries than in the eurozone. Be that as it 
may, we must not forget that in both zones European identity decreases after 2005; 
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and especially after 2009. In terms of influence, the euro did not affect European 
identity initially, only after the advent of the euro crisis – in a negative way.  
Yet, this is not the final answer to the question of European identity and the 
impact of the euro. Further research needs to be done on different case studies. 
Furthermore, there are interesting factors of European identity linked to this study, 
especially the issue of the current rise of nationalism and anti-immigration attitudes. It 
is very probable that this and other aspects have repercussions as well on the recent 
downfall of European identity. Finally, it might be too soon to fully comprehend the 
implications of the crisis. Within a few years (hopefully), studies may be able to 
examine this more clearly from a distance. The last word has not yet been spoken on 
the volatile European identity. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
Chart based on the following question (1973-2011): ‘Generally speaking, do you 
think (your country’s) membership to the European Community (Common Market) 
is… A good thing; A bad thing; Neither good nor bad; Don’t know?’  
 
Data available via EBISS, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_ 
column.cfm?keyID=5&nationID=16,6,10,15,&startdate=1973.09&enddate=2011.05. 
Retrieved 28 February 2013. 
 
‘ 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Flash Eurobarometer 139, 153, 165, 175, 193, 214, 237, 270, 296, 329, 349. 
Chart based on the following question (2002-2012): ‘Since using the euro, do you 
personally feel a little more European than before, a little less European than before or 
would you say that your feeling of being European has not changed?’  
 
Reports online available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/euro_en.htm; 
under ‘Euro-area countries’. Retrieved 28 February 2013. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Chart based the following question (1992-2010): ‘In the near future do you see 
yourself as... (Nationality) only; (Nationality) and European; European and 
(Nationality); European only; Don’t know; None (SPONTANEOUS); Refusal 
(SPONTANEOUS)?’ The percentage displayed in the chart is combined of the 
answers ‘(nationality) and European’ and ‘European and (nationality)’. The first 
answer forms the majority of this combination. 
 
Data available via EBISS, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=266&nationID=
16,6,10,15,&startdate=1992.04&enddate=2010.06. Retrieved 28 February 2013. 
 
No surveys on this topic in 2002 and between 2005 and 2010. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Ipsos MORI, ‘Joining The Euro - Trends Since 1991’ (2007). 
Chart based on the following question (1991-2007): ‘If there were a referendum now 
on whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you 
vote?’ 
 
Online available at http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/ 
78/Joining-The-Euro-Trends-Since-1991.aspx?view=wide. Retrieved 14 May 2013. 
 
No surveys on this topic between 1992 and 1993 and in 2004. 
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Appendix E 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
For source reference, see Appendix C (45). 
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Appendix F 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Charts based on the average of positive answers to the following question (2003-
2012): ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’  
 
Data available via EBISS, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?key 
ID=2202&nationID=27,17,2,22,20,21,24,29,14,15,&startdate=2003.11&enddate=201
2.05. Retrieved 9 June 2013. 
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Appendix G 
 
 
Chart based on the average of the answer ‘Freedom to travel, study and work 
anywhere in the EU’ to the following question (2003-2012): ‘What does the European 
Union mean to you personally?’ 
 
Data available via EBISS, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?key 
ID=2203&nationID=11,1,18,13,6,3,4,7,8,9,23,12,19,26,25,5,10,&startdate=2003.11&
enddate=2012.05. Retrieved 9 June 2013. 
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Appendix H 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
N.B. The percentages of individual categories are rounded to integers.   
 53 
Figure 3 
 
 
For source reference, see Appendix G (51). 
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Appendix I 
 
Overview of English translations of Dutch quotations in this thesis. 
 
Page 
number 
Footnote Translation 
10 37 “You try to say something about a fish population in two 
pools, by taking a sample survey in one pool, and then only of 
the fish that jump out of the water.” 
19 65 “[W]e understand the concerns of the Dutch. About the loss of 
sovereignty. About the rapidity of change, without the citizens. 
Feeling involved. About our financial contribution.” 
21 72 “If the euro falls, the Union falls too.”   
21 74 “Whether the common cultural history and the Judeo-Christian 
background are enough for a sustainable European identity is 
something that everyone can decide for themselves. But it is 
Bismarck that binds all Europeans these days.”  
22 76 “The Dutch have very little in common with the euro and that 
is reflected in our language. Whereas the guilder inspired us to 
all kinds of affectionate nicknames, (…) the best the common 
European currency can do is ‘pleuro’. (…) The lack of 
nicknames tells us something about appreciation.”  
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